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Commentary

Justice John Paul Stevens
His Take on Takings
Alan Weinstein

INTRODUCTION

Justice John Paul Stevens was ap
pointed to the Supreme Court by
President Gerald R. Ford and took his
seat on the Court on December 19,
1975. Stevens announced his retire
ment on April 9, 2010, and his seat will
be occupied by Solicitor General Elena
Kagan, the former Harvard Law School
dean who was confirmed on August 5.
This commentary reviews and analyzes
Stevens's role in shaping the Court's
views on the takings issue in land use
regulation.
Justice Stevens's more than 34 years
on the Court span almost the entire
modern era of the Court's land use juris
prudence. After the Court's two seminal
rulings on the constitutionality of zoning
in 1926 (upholding the constitutional
ity of zoning against a facial challenge
in Euclid) 1 and in 1928 (striking down a
zoning provision as applied to a particu
lar property in Nectow) 2 the Court effec
tively withdrew from the arena of zoning
litigation for almost 50 years, leaving the
development of a body of law governing
land use to the state courts.
Not until 1974, 46 years after Nec
tow, did the Court again consider the
constitutionality of a zoning ordinance,
upholding a zoning code's restrictive
definition of "family" in Village ofBelle
Terre. 3 Since its ruling in Belle Terre, the
Court has decided more than 30 cases
dealing with land use regulation or
closely associated issues such as hous
ing codes. John Paul Stevens is the only
justice who was on the Court during the
entire post-Belle Terre period in which
the Court has defined the constitutional
Alan Weinstein is associate professor and director of
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boundaries for land use regulation. One
of the two areas where Justice Stevens
made his most significant contributions
to the Court's land use jurisprudence
involves takings. 4
The chart on pages 6 and 7 provides
a chronological view of the positions
Justice Stevens took in each of these
cases, which are discussed below.
THE EARLY YEARS

Justice Stevens's pivotal role in shap
ing the Court's views on the takings
issue has been discussed and analyzed
previously, particularly by John Echev
erria and Richard Lazarus 5 in articles
published in 2006, the year after Ste
vens authored the majority opinions in
Kelo 6 and San Remo,7 two of the three
takings cases decided by the Court in
2005. Both authors credit Stevens with
astutely crafting a majority that would
favor his measured view of the takings
clause rather than the doctrinaire "prop
erty rights" view espoused by Justice
Antonin Scalia.
Justice Stevens only gradually grew
into his role as the successful rival to
Justice Scalia's property rights vision of
the takings clause. In Penn Central, 8 the
Court's first land use regulatory takings
case in the post-Belle Terre era, decided
in 1978, Stevens, along with Chief
Justice Warren Burger, joined Justice
William Rehnquist's dissenting opinion
that argued the landmark designation of
New York's Grand Central Terminal was
a taking.
Six members of the Court rejected
the takings claim, finding that neither
the designation of individual land-

marks (like Grand Central) as opposed
to the designation of historic districts,
nor the fact that the landmark commis
sion had turned down Penn Central's
application to construct a high-rise
office building atop the terminal, con
stituted a taking. Justice Rehnquist's
dissent focused on the unfairness of
landmark designation of selected in
dividual buildings, which he saw as
imposing substantial costs on relatively
few property owners for the benefit of
the city as a whole, concluding: "It is
exactly this imposition of general costs
on a few individuals at which the 'tak
ing' protection is directed." 9
Echeverria argues, and I concur,
that there was no incongruity in Justice
Stevens's joining with the dissent
ers in Penn Central. ID A concern about
whether a government regulatory pro
gram applies generally, as opposed to
singling out specific property owners
for special burdens, has been a keynote
of his takings jurisprudence. In Penn
Central, Stevens's concern about not
singling out particular property owners
to bear burdens not generally shared
by others was a major theme in Justice
Rehnquist's dissent. Thus, Rehnquist's
view was far more attractive to Stevens
than the majority's argument that there
was no taking because the designation
of individual landmarks occurred in
the context of a comprehensive plan to
preserve structures of notable historic
or aesthetic interest; the owner of any
given landmark building enjoyed the
benefits that accrued from the fact
that many other buildings were also
designated. 11
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In Moore, a municipal housing code made it a crime for a
grandmother to have her own grandchild live in the home she
shared with her son and his child because its narrow definition
of "family" barred the two grandchildren from living together,
because they were cousins rather than siblings.

Over the next several years, Justice
Stevens continued to vote with Chief
Justice Burger and Justice Rehnquist
in takings cases. For example, in Kaiser
Aetna, 12 decided a year after Penn Central,
both Stevens and Burger joined Reh
nquist's majority opinion, which found
a taking when the federal government
demanded that a private marina allow
public access to a channel dredged so
members of the marina could have ac
cess to the ocean. Rehnquist's rationale
for finding a taking in Kaiser Aetna, that
requiring public access "would result in
an actual physical invasion of the pri
vately owned marina," 13 would become
a "categorical" takings rule in 1982:
Government action that results in a per
manent physical occupation of property
is always a taking. 14 Stevens, again with
Rehnquist and the chief justice, agreed,
joining Justice Marshall's majority
opinion in Loretto finding that a govern
ment regulation, which required certain
property owners to allow cable providers
to affix their equipment to the owners'
buildings in exchange for a token fee,
was a taking. As will be seen later in Ste
vens's dissent in First English and major
ity opinion in Tahoe-Sierra, the temporal
aspect of a challenged regulation would
be an important factor in Stevens's view
of the takings clause, and so the per
manence of the physical occupation in
Loretto, in addition to the fact that only
certain property owners were singled out
under this statute, was no doubt a telling
point for him.
We can also see Justice Stevens's
developing view of the takings clause
in Agins 15 and San Diego Gas & Electric
Co., 16 the two takings cases decided
between Kaiser Aetna and Loretto, and in
Moore v. City ofEast Cleveland, 17 a 1977
case involving a discriminatory housing
ordinance.
In Agins, Justice Powell's opinion
for a unanimous Court rejected a facial
challenge to a zoning ordinance that re
stricted the density of development on
the plaintiffs property. What makes the
Agins opinion noteworthy, however, is
that it announced a new "two-part" tak
ings test: "The application of a general
zoning law to particular property effects
a taking if the ordinance does not sub

stantially advance legitimate state inter
ests ... or denies an owner economically
viable use of his land ... [T]he question
necessarily requires a weighing of pri
vate and public interests." 18 It was no
surprise that Justice Stevens joined this
opinion since he had anticipated the
substantive due process prong of Agins 19
in his concurring opinion in Moore.
In Moore, a municipal housing code
made it a crime for a grandmother to
have her own grandchild live in the
home she shared with her son and his
child because its narrow definition of
"family" barred the two grandchildren
from living together, because they
were cousins rather than siblings. Six
members of the Court had no problem
striking down the ordinance on substan
tive due process grounds, 20 but Justice
Stevens's concurring opinion argued
that the ordinance was actually a taking
of Mrs. Moore's property. Stevens ar
gued that Justice Sutherland's majority
opinion in Euclid v. Ambler supported
his view because it "fused the two ex
press constitutional restrictions on any
state interference with private property
that property shall not be taken without
due process nor for a public purpose
without just compensation into a single
standard: 'Before (a zoning) ordinance
can be declared unconstitutional, (it
must be shown to be) clearly arbitrary
and unreasonable, having no substan
tial relation to the public health, safety,
morals, or general welfare."' 21
In 1981, Justice Stevens, along with
Chief Justice Burger and Justice Rehn
quist, joined Justice Blackmun's major
ity opinion in San Diego Gas dismissing
a takings claim on the ground that there
had not been a final determination in
the California courts as to whether a
taking had occurred. What is interest
ing about Stevens's position in San
Diego Gas is that he, as well as Burger,
declined to join Rehnquist's concur
ring opinion that stated he "would have
little difficulty in agreeing with much of
what is said in the dissenting opinion of
Justice Brennan." 22
Justice Brennan's dissent, joined by
Justices Stewart, Marshall, and Powell,
argued that there had been a final rul
ing below on the issue of whether a
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compensatory remedy was required for
a taking-the California Supreme Court
had denied review of a lower court rul
ing that no compensatory remedy was
available for a taking-and that "once
a court establishes that there was a
regulatory 'taking,' the Constitution de
mands that the government entity pay
just compensation for the period com
mencing on the date the regulation first
effected the 'taking' and ending on the
date the government entity chooses to
rescind or otherwise amend the regula
tion."23 The view that a "temporary tak
ing" required payment of compensation
would subsequently be "agreed with"
by Justice Rehnquist in his majority
opinion in First English, 24 from which
Stevens would dissent. His position in
San Diego Gas suggested as much, and
provided a strong hint that the temporal
aspect of a challenged regulation would
be an important factor in Stevens's view
of the takings clause.
The Court ruled on four more tak
ings cases associated with land use, and
one eminent domain case, between
San Diego Gas and the "1987 Trilogy"
of takings cases (Keystone, First Eng
lish, and Nol/an), that would transform
the Court's takings jurisprudence and
clearly reveal Justice Stevens's views
on the takings issue. But by 1985, these
pre-Trilogy cases showed that Stevens
no longer shared Justices Burger and
Rehnquist's view of the takings clause.
Justice Stevens continued to vote
with Chief Justice Burger and Justice
Rehnquist in the first two cases decided
after San Diego Gas. As discussed above,
Stevens joined Justice Marshall's major
ity opinion in Loretto announcing that a
permanent physical invasion of private
property was a "categorical" per se tak
ing. And in Midkiff, 25 a 1984 eminent do
main case, he joined Justice O'Connor's·
opinion for a unanimous Court, holding
that a Hawaiian land reform measure
enacted to remedy a concentration of
land ownership was a lawful use of the
eminent domain power. But the follow
ing year, in Williamson County, 26 Stevens
wrote separately for the first time in
a takings case and made clear that he
saw the takings clause differently than
Burger and Rehnquist.
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One point on which Justice Stevens and Chief Justice
Rehnquist disagreed in Keystone would play an important
I role in future takings cases.

Williamson County was the Court's
third failed attempt in five years to rule
on the question of whether a compen
satory remedy was required if a court
found there had been a temporary regu
latory taking of private property. The
Court's first two attempts, Agins and
San Diego Gas, had failed on procedural
grounds; Williamson County met the
same fate. 27 Agins had effectively es
tablished an "application requirement"
ripeness rule for an as-applied com
pensatory taking claim. In Williamson
County, the Court added two additional
ripeness requirements for an as-applied
claim.
Justice Blackmun's majority opinion,
joined by Justices Burger, Rehnquist,
Brennan, Marshall, and O'Connor, held
that a federal court takings claim was
not ripe until a claimant could demon
strate that: (1) he had sought, and been
denied, a variance from the challenged
ordinance and (2) no compensatory
takings remedy was available in state
court. Because the plaintiff in William
son County had failed to seek a variance,
the majority ruled the case was not ripe,
reversed a Tennessee court's award of
compensatory damages for the alleged
taking, and remanded the case without
ruling on the compensatory question.
Stevens, while concurring in the judg
ment, wrote separately to oppose the
concept that the takings clause required
a compensatory remedy for a "tempo
rary taking."
Justice Stevens's concurring opinion
claimed that the "[t]emporary harms
resulting from a regulatory decision
fall into two broad subcategories: (1)
those that result from a deliberate deci
sion to appropriate certain property for
public use for a limited period of time
and (2) those that are a by-product of
governmental decision making." 28 Ste
vens then argued that while the first
subcategory "is correctly characterized
as a 'temporary taking,' [t]he second
subcategory is fairly characterized as an
inevitable cost of doing business in a
highly regulated society." 29 In Stevens's
view, compensation is required only for
the first subcategory. As long as govern
ment has acted fairly and in good faith,
delays in regulatory approvals caused by

disputes over governmental decisions
that impose costs on property owners
do not require compensation, even if
the government decision proved to be
wrong. Stevens would ultimately garner
a majority of the Court for this view 17
years later in Tahoe-Sierra.
A year after Williamson County, Jus
tice Stevens broke with Justices Burger
and Rehnquist to author the majority
opinion in McDonald, Sommer & Frates v.
Yolo County, 30 in which the Court again
declined to address the compensation
question on ripeness grounds. In Yolo
County, the plaintiff had claimed a tak
ing after the denial of its subdivision
proposal. Stevens's opinion held that
the claim was not ripe because the
decisions below in the California state
courts "leave open the possibility that
some development will be permitted" 31
if the plaintiff submitted a second de
velopment proposal; however, Stevens
also noted that repeated "futile" ap
plications need not be made. 32 Justice
White's dissent, joined by Justices
Burger, Powell and Rehnquist, argued
that the subdivision denial was a final
decision that effected a taking; but
Rehnquist, joined by Powell, declined
to join the final part of Justice White's
dissent claiming that compensation was
required for the temporary taking, argu
ing that the compensation question in
this case should first be addressed by
the courts below.
THE 1987 TAKINGS TRILOGY

The Court finally addressed the com
pensation question the next year in
First English, 33 one of the trilogy of tak
ings cases the Court decided in 1987.
The Court had seen only one new
justice appointed since its last substan
tive takings decision in Loretto in 1982,
but that appointment was significant. In
1986, Chief]ustice Burger announced
his retirement and President Reagan
nominated Justice Rehnquist as the
new chief justice; D.C. Court of Appeals
Judge Antonin Scalia took Rehnquist's
seat. Justice Scalia quickly took a lead
ing role as an advocate for the "property
rights" view of the takings clause 34 and
for the following two decades he and
Justice Stevens would be intellectual,
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and ultimately "political,'' adversaries
on the takings question. 35
Justice Stevens's view prevailed in
Keystone, the first takings case decided
that term, while the view favored by
Chief Justice Rehnquist and Justice
Scalia prevailed in the next two, First
English and Nol/an. In Keystone Bitumi
nous Coal Association v. DeBenedictis, 36
Stevens's majority opinion upheld a
Pennsylvania statute prohibiting mining
that caused subsidence of the surface
that was similar to the statute the Court
had declared unconstitutional 65 years
earlier in Pennsylvania Coal Co. v. Ma
hon.37 Stevens distinguished Keystone
from Pennsylvania Coal by stressing that
the state legislature, in enacting the
statute at issue in Keystone, sought to
address important public interests by
minimizing subsidence, whereas the
act struck down in Pennsylvania Coal
sought merely to balance the private
economic interests of the coal compa
nies against the private interests of the
surface owners. Analyzing the statute
under both the first prong of Agins and
the numerous takings cases in which
the Court denied takings claims when
government "merely restrains uses of
property that are tantamount to a public
nuisance," 38 Stevens concluded that
the statute served a substantial public
interest in preventing activities similar
to public nuisances, then found that the
statute did not cause a deprivation in
value significant enough to satisfy the
burden required to find a regulatory tak
ing under Agins's second prong. Rehn
quist argued in dissent that there was
no significant difference between the
current statute and the act struck down
in Pennsylvania Coal, so the 1922 deci
sion was controlling and the statute was
a i:aking of property.
One point on which Justice Stevens
and Chief Justice Rehnquist disagreed
in Keystone would play an important
role in future takings cases. The
"segmentation" issue involves how
the Court would define the property
interest to be evaluated for takings
purposes. The more narrowly a prop
erty interest is defined the more likely
a taking will be found. An example of
this would be defining the property

VOTES IN LAND USE TAKINGS CASES DURING JUSTICE STEVENS'S TENURE

PiD'M'!tW@il11lii!498. . . . .~. . .#lij!1iiift·lft®lll~
Moore v. City of
East Cleveland

431 U.S. 494 (1977)

Penn Central v. City
ofNew York

438 U.S. 104 (1978)

Kaiser Aetna v. U.S.

444 U.S. 164 (1979)

Moore claimed city housing ordinance
violated due process clause of 14th
Amendment; Ohio Ct. App. confirmed
violation; Supreme Court reversed;
ordinance bore no rational relationship to
permissible state objectives

Powell, joined by
Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun

Penn Central appealed N.Y. Ct. App.
decision holding city's landmark
preservation act as applied to Grand Central
Station did not constitute a taking; Supreme
Court affirmed

Brennan, joined
by Stewart, White,
Marshall, Blackmun,
Powell

Rehnquist, joined
by Burger and
Stevens

United States brought action against marina
owners claiming their marina was subject to
navigational servitude; Ct. App. held in favor
of United States; Supreme Court reversed and
held compensation was required if United
States wanted marina open to public access

Rehnquist, joined
by Burger, Stewart,
White, Powell,
Stevens

Blackmun, joined
by Brennan and
Marshall

California Supreme Court held city did not
violate 5th/14th Amendments by restricting
future development of property; Supreme
Court affirmed

Powell (unanimous)

City rezoned industrial land; impacted
petitioners' property; Cal. Ct. App. denied
damages for inverse condemnation; Supreme
Court dismissed for lack of jurisdiction (Ct.
App. decision not final)

Blackmun, joined
by Burger, White,
Rehnquist, Stevens

N.Y. Ct. App. held that temporary
permanent occupation of property did
not constitute a taking; Supreme Court
reversed/remanded for state court to
determine appropriate compensation

Marshall, joined
by Burger, Powel,
Rehnquist, Stevens,
O'Connor

Hawaii Land Reform Act (to end
concentrated land ownership) held
unconstitutional by U.S. Ct. App.; Supreme
Court reversed and remanded; act did not
violate 5th Amendment

O'Connor, joined
by Burger, Brennan,
White, Blackmun,
Powell, Rehnquist,
Stevens

Brennan, joined by
Marshall
Stevens

Burger
Stewart, joined by
Rehnquist, White

···········································································································································································
Agins v. City of
Tiburon

447 U.S. 255 (1980)

San Diego Gas &
Electric Co. v. City
ofSan Diego

450 U.S. 621 (1981)
Loretto v.
Teleprompter
Manhattan

458 U.S. 419 (1982)

Hawaii Housing
Authority v. Midkiff

467 U.S. 229 (1984)

Note: Marshall did not participate
Williamson Country
RPCv. Hamilton
Bank

Bank sued claiming zoning laws constituted
a taking; Ct. App. reinstated damages as
just compensation, petitioner sought cert;
Supreme Court reversed and remanded

473 U.S. 172 (1985)

Note: Powell did notparticipate

MacDonald,
Sommer&Fratesv.
Yolo County

477 U.S. 340 (1986)

Keystone Bituminous
Coal v. DeBenedictis

480 U.S. 470 ( 1987)
First Evangelical
Lutheran Church v.
County of
Los Angeles

482 U.S. 304 (1987)

Nol/an v. Califomia
Coastal Commission

483 U.S. 835 (1987)

Blackmun, joined
by Burger, Brennan,
Marshall, Rehnquist,
O'Connor

Rehnquist

Brennan, joined by
Stewart, Marshall,
Powell

Blackmun, joined by
Brennan and White

Brennan, joined by
Marshall

White

Stevens

Landowner's subdivision plan rejected by
county planning commission; landowner
claimed land restricted; constituted
deprivation of entire economic use; trial
court held complaint failed to state c/a; Cal.
Ct. App. affirmed, Supreme Court affirmed;
county board had not issued final definitive
position regarding zoning restrictions

Stevens, joined by
Brennan, Marshall,
Blackmun,
O'Connor

Coal co. claimed portion of Pa. act that
regulated subsurface mining under structures
constituted taking; District Ct. held for Pa.,
did not constitute a taking (public health
regulation); Supreme Court affirmed

Stevens, joined by
Brennan, White,
Marshall, Blackmun

Rehnquist,
joined by Powell,
O'Connor, Scalia

County barred construction in flood-prone
area; church claimed ordinance denied use
of its property; Cal. S. Ct. struck down claim
for damages; Cal. Ct. App. affirmed; Supreme
Court reversed and remanded

Rehnquist, joined
by Brennan, White,
Marshall, Powell,
Scalia

Stevens, joined in
part by Blackmun
and O'Connor

Commission conditioned permit sought by
owners of beach front lot on their granting
public easement across their land; claimed
this was in violation of 5th Amendment;
Cal. Ct. App. held coastal commission could
condition permit on easement; Supreme
Court reversed and held it required just
compensation

Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist, White,
Powell, O'Connor

White, joined by
Burger and Powell,
and Rehnquist
joined in part
Rehnquist, joined
by Powell

Brennan, joined by
Marshall
Blackmun
Stevens, joined by
Blackmun

(continued)

City mobile home rent control ordinance
challenged-petitioners claimed it
amounted to physical taking; Cal. trial
and appellate cts. held ordinance did not
constitute a taking; Supreme Court affirmed

O'Connor, joined by
Rehnquist, White,
Stevens, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas

Lucas v. South
Carolina Coastal
Council
505 U.S. 1003
(1992)

Beachfront Management Act prevented
Lucas from building on his lots (owned prior
to enactment of statute); trial ct. held land
valueless; S.C. Sup. Ct. reversed and held
no taking occurred; Supreme Court reversed
and remanded

Scalia, joined by
Rehnquist, White,
O'Connor, Thomas

Dolan v. City of
Tigard
512 U.S.374(1994)

City conditioned Dolan's permit on
dedicating property for a ftoodway and
public bike path; Dolan claimed this was a
taking; Or. Supreme Court held conditions
reasonable; Supreme Court reversedcity did not establish conditions were
proportionate to impact of development

Rehnquist, joined
by O'Connor, Scalia,
Kennedy, Thomas

TRPA determined Suitum's land was
ineligible for development, but denied
relief; Sui tum claimed a taking; lower ct
determined petition not ripe; Supreme
Court vacated lower ct. determinations and
held that case was ripe because TRPA had
made final determination

Souter (unanimous
in pertinent part)

Yee v. City of
Escondido
503 U.S. 519 (1992)

Blackmun
Souter

...........................................................................................................................................................................
Blackmun
Kennedy

Stevens
Souter (cert
improperly granted)

Stevens, joined
by Blackmun and
Ginsburg
Souter

...........................................................................................................................................................................
Suitum v. Tahoe
Regional Planning
Agent)'
520 U.S. 725 (1997)

·····························

6~~~,~~-~; -~i~i·.:i;~-.:i -~·~1~;.;£~·,· <l-~~-;i~~;;~~

City ofMonterey v.
Del Monte Dunes
526 U.S. 687 (l 999 )

Palazzolo v. Rhode
Island
533 U.S. 606 (2001)

Scalia, joined
by Thomas and
O'Connor

······································

of property after rejection of development
plan for beachfront property; jury found for
developer; appellate ct. affirmed; Supreme
Court affirmed--<leprivation of use of
property was up to jury to determine
Resource management council deemed
Palazollo's land protected coastal wetland
and eventual application to fill property
was denied; state ct. rejected takings claim;
Supreme Court affirmed in part and reversed
in pare, remanded for further proceedings

s~~-,;~·

Kennedy, joined by
Rehnquist, Stevens,
Scalia, Thomas

Kennedy, joined
by Rehnquist,
O'Connor, Scalia,
Thomas and in part
by Stevens

···············································

Souter, joined by
O'Connor, Ginsburg,
Breyer (concurring
in part and
dissenting in part)

O'Connor
Scalia

Ginsburg, joined by
Souter and Breyer

Stevens

Breyer

···········································································································································································

Agency imposed temporary moratoria on
Rehnquist, joined
development of lakefront; landowners claimed
Stevens, joined by
by Scalia and
deprivation of all viable economic use; district
O'Connor, Kennedy,
Thomas
ct. held taking occurred; ct. app. reversed;
Souter, Ginsburg,
Supreme Court affirmed app. ct.-no taking
Thomas, joined by
Breyer
occurred, finding taking in every temporary
Scalia
situation would be unreasonable
...........................................................................................................................................................................
Chevron claimed cap on rent for company
owned service stations was unconstitutional
Lingle v. Chevron
taking; District ct. held rent cap was in
O'Connor
Kennedy
544 U.S. 528 (2005)
violation of 5th/14th Amendments; ct. app
(unanimous)
affirmed; Supreme Court reversed

Tahoe-Sierra
Preservation Council
v. TahoeRPA
535 U.S. 302 (2002)

San Remo Hotel v.
City/County ofSan
Francisco
545 U.S. 323 (2005)

Hotel owners sued claiming that ordinance
requiring in lieu fee to convert to tourist
hotel was a taking; state court rejected
claim; U.S. Ct. app. rejected takings claims;
Supreme Court affirmed

Stevens, joined
by Scalia, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer

City initiated condemnation proceedings on
nine properties; trial court prohibited taking;
Conn. Supreme Court reversed and upheld
takings; Supreme Court affirmed Conn.
Supreme Court-economic development
constituted public use

Stevens, joined by
Kennedy, Souter,
Ginsburg, Breyer

Rehnquist, joined
by O'Connor,
Kennedy, Thomas

Not applicable

........ .......... ..... . ... . .. ...... ......... ......... ....... .. .... ..... .. . . ....... ....... .. ...... ........ ........... .......... ...... ........... ..... . .. . . . . . . . ......... ...
Keio v. City of
New London
545 U.S. 469 (2005)

Kennedy

O'Connor, joined by
Rehnquist, Scalia,
Thomas
Thomas

···········································································································································································
Stop the Beach
Renourishment v.
Florida Dep 't of
Environmental
Protection
130 S.Ct. 2592
(2010)

Beachfront property owners brought facial
takings challenge to Act providing for beach
restoration, claiming it had the effect of taking
certain property rights; Fla. Supreme Court
ruled there was no taking under state property
law; Supreme Court unanimously found there
was no taking under background principles of
Florida property law, but four justices argued
there could be a "judicial taking" of property

Stevens did not participate (owns beachfront
property in Florida)

Scalia (unanimous
in part) and joined
by Roberts, Thomas,
Alito in part

Kennedy, joined by
Sotomayor
Breyer, joined by
Ginsburg

Amertcan Planning Association
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Stevens was alone regarding the importance of the temporal
question in First English, but his would become the majority
view 15 years later in Tahoe-Sierra when the question of whether
compensation was also constitutionally mandated for "normal
delays" came before the Court.
interest affected in Keystone as only the
coal that would have to be left in place
to avoid subsidence, rather than defin
ing the property interest as the entire
coal deposit.
The segmentation issue was not
new. In Pennsylvania Coal, Justices
Holmes and Brandeis had disagreed
on this point, with Holmes defining
the property interest affected as the
coal left in place and Brandeis as the
entire coal mining enterprise. The issue
had also been a factor in Penn Central,
where the plaintiff's claim that its "air
rights"-the right to develop the space
above the existing terminal-were a
separate property interest that had been
taken when the Landmarks Commis
sion denied it permission to build an
office tower above the terminal. In 1978,
Justice Stevens had joined Justice Reh
nquist's dissent in Penn Central, finding
a taking, in part because the "air rights"
above the terminal were a recognizable
property interest. 39 By 1987, his views
had changed.
Justice Stevens was a dissenter in the
other two cases decided in 1987, First
English 40 and No//an. 41 First English, a
6-3 decision, at last resolved the com
pensatory question. Rehnquist's opinion
held that the Just Compensation Clause
of the Fifth Amendment allowed a prop
erty owner to recover damages when a
land use regulation affects a "temporary
taking" of property. Stevens's dissent,
joined by Blackmun and O'Connor as to
the first and third of the following points,
argued: (1) The Court should have
found that the county ordinance at issue,
which prohibited permanent structures
in an area prone to flash floods that had
recently claimed several lives, was not
a taking; (2) the majority was wrong in
ruling that compensation is the appropri
ate remedy for a "temporary taking";
(3) the Court should have required the
plaintiff to exhaust his state remedies
before hearing the case; and (4) it is the
Due Process Clause, rather than the
Just Compensation Clause, that protects
property owners from improper, unfair, or
unnecessarily protracted governmental
decision making.
Here again we see the importance
Justice Stevens placed on the temporal

element. His dissent argued that
"[r]egulations are three dimensional:
They have depth, width and length."
He explained that depth refers to the
restrictions placed on the property,
width refers to the amount of property
burdened by the restrictions, and length
refers to the duration of the restric
tions.42 He then argued: "Just as it
would be senseless to ignore these first
two factors in assessing the economic ef
fect of a regulation, one cannot conduct
the inquiry without considering the
duration of the restriction." 43 Finally, he
noted that the majority had excluded
"normal delays in obtaining building
permits, changes in zoning ordinances,
variances and the like" 44 from its com
pensation rule and argued this was an
artificial distinction based on the logic
of the majority's reasoning. Stevens was
alone regarding the importance of the
temporal question in First English, but
his would become the majority view
15 years later in Tahoe-Sierra when the
question of whether compensation was
also constitutionally mandated for "nor
mal delays" came before the Court.
The last of the 1987 cases, No/Ian,
was significant in three respects: (1) It
was the first Supreme Court case since
Pennsylvania Coal holding that a land
use regulation violated the takings
clause, 45 (2) Justice Scalia's majority
opinion was his first on the takings is
sue, and (3) the case was the first in
which the Court analyzed land use ex
actions under the takings clause. Scalia
held that a land use exaction was valid
only if there was an "essential nexus"
between the condition imposed on the
property and the regulatory purpose for
the condition; here, a requirement that
the Nollans dedicate a lateral easement
for public access across their beachfront
property as a condition for obtain
ing a permit to build a larger house.
The Coastal Commission had claimed
the easement was required to reduce
obstacles to the public's viewing the
beach, lower psychological obstacles
to public use of the beach, and reduce
beach congestion caused by the con
struction of the Nollans' house. Scalia
argued that requiring the dedication
of an easement, a recognized property
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interest, appropriately subjected the
dedication requirement to heightened
scrutiny and the commission had not
sustained its burden of demonstrating
that the condition it imposed substan
tially advanced the interests it had cited
to justify the requirement. In short, the
commission could obtain an easement
from the Nollans only through purchase
or condemnation and payment of just
compensation.
There were three separate dissents,
authored by Justices Brennan, Black
mun, and Stevens, with four justices
dissenting in total. It is intriguing to
speculate whether the dissenters' views,
in fact, might have garnered a major
ity at some point in the Court's delib
erations, since much of Justice Scalia's
argument refutes Brennan's views in a
manner more reminiscent of a dissent
than a majority opinion.
Justice Brennan's lengthy dissent,
joined by Justice Marshall, argued that
the majority had improperly subjected
the dedication requirement to height
ened scrutiny and, even though that
standard was not required, the ease
ment requirement could meet it. Inter
estingly, these two justices had been
part of the majority in First English. Jus
tice Blackmun's much shorter dissent
agreed with Brennan that heightened
scrutiny was not required and noted
that Justice Scalia's opinion did not im
plicate the public-trust doctrine. Justice
Stevens's dissent, joined by Blackmun,
his fellow dissenter in First English, was
essentially an "I told you so" taking
Brennan to task for his San Diego Gas
dissent arguing a compensation remedy
was required for a temporary taking
and for joining the majority adopting
that rule in First English. 46 Stevens
noted that although "[e]ven the wisest
lawyers would have to acknowledge
great uncertainty about the scope of the
Court's takings jurisprudence," First
English made local government pay a
price for honestly misjudging the law in
this uncertain area. 47 He then softened
that criticism, presumably in the hope
of garnering Brennan's vote in a future
takings case, by praising Brennan for
recognizing that government needed
some flexibility in mediating between
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Justice Blackmun wrote a stinging dissent in Lucas that famously
I began, "Today the Court launches a missile to kill a mouse."

the desires of private developers and
the preservation of public resources, and
implicitly encouraging him to recognize
that his support for the compensation
remedy may have been mistaken.
JUSTICE STEVENS AND THE PROPERTY
RIGHTS COURT

It would be five years, however, before
the Court heard Lucas v. South Caro
lina Coastal Councif, 48 its next land use
takings case. In the meantime, Justice
Brennan had retired in 1990 and the
first President Bush appointed David
Souter, a little-known state appeals
court judge from New Hampshire to fill
his seat. There were two other changes
on the Court over that five-year pe
riod. President Reagan had appointed
Anthony Kennedy to replace Justice
Powell in 1988 and Bush appointed
Clarence Thomas to replace Justice
Marshall in 1991. In each of these cases,
as well as the appointment of Justice
O'Connor to replace Justice Stewart in
1981, the new Justice was more conser
vative than his or her predecessor. The
Thomas appointment was particularly
critical. Marshall had been favorable to
Stevens's view of the takings clause in
Keystone and Nollan; Thomas clearly
would favor Scalia's view. As a result,
the 1992 Court that considered Lucas
was markedly more conservative than
the 1987 Court which had decided the
"takings trilogy."
In Lucas, Justice Scalia, joined by Jus
tices Rehnquist, White, O'Connor, and
Thomas, announced the Court's second
"categorical" taking rule: A regulation
that denied all economically viable use
of property was a taking without regard
to the purported governmental interest
served unless the restriction imposed
by the regulation either inhered in the
title to the property or could have been
achieved under the state's common law
of property. Applying this rule, Scalia
found that the South Carolina coastal
management statute had prohibited
David Lucas from developing his two
beachfront lots and thus was an unlawful
taking of his property. Scalia noted that
the legislature could not lawfully deny
all use even if the stated purpose of its
regulation was to prevent a harm, includ

ing preventing a "noxious use" of pri
vate property. "Any limitation so severe
cannot be newly legislated or decreed
(without compensation) but must inhere
in the title itself, in the restrictions that
background principles of the State's law
of property and nuisance already place
upon land ownership, he wrote. 49
Justice Kennedy concurred in the
judgment, but wrote separately to dis
agree with Justice Scalia's view that a
state could not enact new regulatory
initiatives that would impose severe
restrictions on property without having
to pay compensation to the affected
property owners, arguing that "[t]he
common law of nuisance is too narrow
a confine for the exercise of regulatory
power in a complex and interdependent
society." 50 As we will see, Kennedy's
concurring opinion in Lucas was a signal
that Justice Scalia apparently chose to
overlook but Stevens did not.
Justice Blackmun wrote a stinging
dissent in Lucas that famously began, "To
day the Court launches a missile to kill a
mouse." 51
Justice Stevens's dissent disagreed with
Justice Scalia's new categorical rule on a
number of grounds. For one, he thought it
was arbitrary, noting that a regulation that
reduced property values by 95 percent
would now be treated very differently
from one that reduced property value by
100 percent. The rule also implicated his
concerns with the segmentation issue:
"... developers and investors may market
specialized estates to take advantage of
the Court's new rule. The smaller the
estate, the more likely that a regulatory
change will effect a total taking." 52 He
also saw the "denial of all use" standard
as concerned too much with the effect
of the regulation and not enough with
the reason for the regulation. Here, be
cause the challenged statute affected all
coastal property owners in an effort to
prevent serious harm, Stevens did not
view the law as "singling out" any par
ticular property owner to bear an unfair
burden and thus the law was not a tak
ing. Stevens analogized the effect of the
statute to the Court's First Amendment
cases, and in particular Scalia's recent
and controversial opinion in Smith,
which upheld neutral laws of general
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applicability even when they imposed a
substantial burden on the free exercise
of religion. 53 Stevens argued: "[If] such a
neutral law of general applicability may
severely burden constitutionally pro
tected interests in liberty, a comparable
burden on property owners should not
be considered unreasonably onerous." 54
Justice Scalia continued to press his
property rights agenda over the follow
ing decade, but arguably was not as suc
cessful as he might have hoped. In the
Court's next takings case, Dolan v. Ciry
o/Tigard,55 an exactions case like No/
fan, Chief Justice Rehnquist's majority
opinion was joined by Justices O'Connor,
Scalia, Kennedy, and Thomas. Rehnquist
had no trouble agreeing that the exaction
here satisfied Noffan's essential nexus
requirement. As a result, the Court now
had to decide "whether the degree of the
exactions demanded by the city's permit
conditions bears the required relation
ship to the projected impact of petition
er's proposed development," a question
the Court had not reached in Noffan be
cause that exaction had failed the essen
tial nexus test. After acknowledging that
the various state courts which had ad
dressed this issue had crafted standards
ranging from lax to exacting, the Court
adopted a "rough proportionality" test5 6
similar to the "reasonable relationship"
test used by the majority of states. Ap
plying that test, the Court ruled that the
city had not met its burden of proof with
regard to the exactions it had demanded
and remanded the case to give the city
an opportunity to meet the Court's just
announced test. 57
Justice Stevens dissented, joined
by Justices Blackmun and Ruth Bader
Ginsburg, who had been appointed to
fill the seat vacated when Justice White
retired in 1993. Stevens 's dissent echoes
what should now be familiar themes in
his view of the takings clause, concerns
about the segmentation issue and the
need for the Court to give government
adequate leeway in mediating between
private and public interests. As regards
segmentation, Stevens criticized the
Court's preoccupation with the segment
of the property subject to the exaction
rather than looking to the entire prop
erty, and particularly the question of
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In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Stevens parted company with the
liberal justices and joined Justice Kennedy's majority opinion,
along with Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas, upholding
a jury verdict finding a taking and awarding compensation.

whether the required dedication might
benefit the property owner to some
extent. On the second point, Stevens
argued that the majority was wrong to
place the burden on government to
justify its dedication by meeting the
new "rough proportionality" test, argu
ing: "[T]he burden of demonstrating
that those conditions have unreasonably
impaired the economic value of the pro
posed improvement belongs squarely
on the shoulders of the party challeng
ing the state action's constitutionality.
That allocation of burdens has served
us well in the past. The Court has stum
bled badly today by reversing it." 58 Jus
tice Souter's separate dissent essentially
agreed with Stevens on this point. 59
Dolan was Justice Blackmun's last
land use case. He retired in the sum
mer of 1994 and was replaced by Justice
Stephen Breyer. The membership of
the Court would then remain stable
for 11 years, the second longest period
without a change in composition in the
Court's history. This Court could easily
be seen as divided into three groups:
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas
were avowedly conservative; Justices
Stevens, Ginsburg, Breyer, and increas
ingly Souter, were liberal; and Justices
O'Connor and Kennedy were some
where in between. The Court's subse
quent takings cases would now largely
be decided on the basis of whether Scalia
or Stevens could gain the support of one,
or both, of the justices in the middle.
But the Court's next three takings
cases, Suitum v. Tahoe Regional Planning
Agency60 in 1997, City ofMonterey v. Del
Monte Dunes61 in 1999, and Palazzolo
v. Rhode Islanrf°Z in 2001, failed to pit
Stevens and Scalia as rivals seeking to
attract four other justices to his view. In
Suitum, Justice Souter announced the
Court's unanimous judgment revers
ing a Ninth Circuit ruling that a tak
ings claim was not ripe and remanded
the matter. Justice Scalia's concur
rence, joined by Justices Thomas and
O'Connor, argued that Souter's opinion
should not have discussed the availabil
ity and potential value of Transferable
Development Rights (TDRs) as rel
evant to the issue of whether there had
been a taking, because the availability

ofTDRs properly goes to the question
of whether there has been just compen
sation after a taking is found.
In Del Monte Dunes, Justice Stevens
parted company with the liberal justices
and joined Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion, along with Justices Rehnquist,
Scalia, and Thomas, upholding a jury
verdict finding a taking and awarding
compensation. The facts in this case
showed that the city had, over a five-year
period, denied approval for development
five separate times, each time suggesting
that if the developer would only address
the city's concerns, all would be well
when the developer reapplied. After 19
separate site plans had been rejected
because the city's concerns were contin
ually shifting, the developer sued. These
facts, showing government unfairly
burdening a specific land owner are, of
course, the key to Stevens's vote. From
the standpoint of takings jurisprudence,
however, the most important ruling in
Del Monte Dunes was the rejection by all
the Justices of the Ninth Circuit's rul
ing that Dolan's "rough proportionality"
standard should be applied to all takings
claims based on the "fails to substantially
advance" prong of Agins in takings cases,
rather than limited to claims involving
exactions.
In Palazzo/lo, Justice Scalia's adversary
was Justice O'Connor, not Justice Ste
vens. The Court was unusually fractured
here, producing six separate opinions.
Justice Kennedy's majority opinion was
joined by Justices Rehnquist, O'Connor,
Scalia, Thomas, and in part, by Stevens.
But Stevens also wrote separately, con
curring in part and dissenting in part.
O'Connor and Scalia wrote concurring
opinions, each taking the other to task,
albeit O'Connor doing so less harshly
than Scalia. Justice Ginsburg's dissent
was joined by Justices Souter and Breyer,
who also dissented separately. The most
critical issue before the Court here was
the "notice" rule, which held that a land
owner who had notice of a regulation at
the time he acquired the property was
barred from bringing a takings claim
based on that regulation. The majority
rejected the "notice" rule, but Scalia and
O'Connor bickered over what role hav
ing preacquisition notice of a regulation

October 2010 Vol. 62, No. 10 I p.10

should play in determining an owner's
"reasonable investment-backed expecta
tions" as part of a Penn Central analysis.
O'Connor argued that because "[t]he
regulatory regime in place at the time the
claimant acquires the property at issue
helps to shape the reasonableness of those
expectations," 63 it must be considered.
In his concurrence, Scalia took direct aim
at Justice O'Connor: "I write separately
to make clear that my understanding of
how the issues discussed in ... the Court's
opinion must be considered on remand
is not Justice O'Connor's." 64 He argued
that notice should play no role in a Penn
Central takings analysis because doing
otherwise would only allow the govern
ment to benefit from its own misdeed in
enacting the unconstitutional regulation
in the first place. 65
Stevens's separate opinion showed
that the temporal element remained
critical in his view of the takings clause.
Arguing that "[p]recise specification of
the moment a taking occurred and of
the nature of the property interest taken
is necessary in order to determine an
appropriately compensatory remedy," 66
he concluded that either the claimant
here was not the proper party to bring
the claim, because the taking occurred
before he owned the property, or "if the
only viable takings claim has a different
predicate that arose later, that claim is
not ripe." 67
AND THE WINNER IS ... JUSTICE STEVENS

Between 2002 and 2005, the Court ruled
on three land use takings cases: Tahoe
Sierra, San Remo, and Keio. A fourth
case, Lingle, although not itself a land
use case, overruled a previous land use
takings case, Agins. Justice Stevens was
in the majority in each of these and au
thored all of the opinions except Lingle.
Although Justice Scalia did not dissent
from the Court's unanimous opinion
in Lingle, and joined Stevens's majority
opinion in San Remo, he was in the mi
nority in Tahoe-Sierra and Keio, the two
cases where the "property rights" view
of the takings clause was really at issue.
It was clear that the Court's acceptance
of that view of the takings clause over
the past 15 years, as could be seen from
the majorities which favored the com
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The reason for the moratorium-ensuring the continued protec
tion of Lake Tahoe-would provide a benefit in return for the
burden of the moratorium, thus effectively providing an "average
reciprocity of advantage."

pensatory remedy in First English, the
heightened standard of review for exac
tions in Nol/an and Dolan, the categori
cal "denial of all use" takings rule in
Lucas, the approval of the jury's award of
damages for a taking in Del Monte Dunes,
and the invalidation of the "notice" rule
as a bar to takings claims in Pa/azzol/o
had come to an end.
The Tahoe-Sierra6 8 case involved a
challenge by almost 500 property owners
to a series of moratoria halting develop
ment for 32 months while the Tahoe Re
gional Planning Agency (TRPA) prepared
a new regional plan to protect Lake Ta
hoe from degradation of its famously clear
water due to the effects of new develop
ment, such as increased stormwater runoff
from impervious surfaces. The property
owners had won at the federal district
court. That lower court, after deciding
that the moratoria were not a temporary
taking under Penn Centrafs balancing test,
ruled that they were a categorical "denial
of all economically viable use" taking
under Lucas during the 32 months of the
moratoria, and ordered TRPA to pay dam
ages to the property owners. 69
Both TRPA and the property own
ers appealed. TRPA appealed the dis
trict court's finding of a taking and the
property owners appealed the district
court's ruling that the total time period
for the moratoria was 32 months, rather
than a longer period for which they had
argued. The property owners did not
appeal the district court's denial of their
Penn Central temporary takings claim.
The Ninth Circuit ruled against the
property owners and for TRPA, holding
that the temporary takings doctrine an
nounced in First English does not apply
to temporary development moratoria
because a temporary taking should not
be considered a denial of all economi
cally viable use under Lucas. 70
Justice Stevens's opinion, joined by
both Justices O'Connor and Kennedy
in addition to Justices Souter, Ginsburg,
and Breyer, involved all three of the is
sues that shaped his view of the takings
clause: the potential for manipulation of
outcomes due to segmentation of prop
erty interests; a concern for the tempo
ral aspect of a regulation; and deference
to general government regulations that

sought to achieve legitimate public pur
poses. Here, his first two concerns were
merged, since the plaintiffs' Lucas claim
rested on a temporal segmentation of
their property interest: the 32-month
period during which they argued they
could make no economically viable use
of their property. Stevens essentially ar
gued that temporal segmentation could
no more be a valid basis for finding a
taking than would segmentation of just
the portion of a property that could not
be "used" due to a regulation, while the
rest of the property was not so burdened
or focusing just on the uses for a prop
erty that a regulation prohibited when
other economically viable uses were al
lowed. In this view, Lucas's requirement
of a denial of all economically viable use
would not be satisfied by looking only
at the period a moratorium was in effect,
since the property affected by the mora
torium would regain its value as soon as
the moratorium was lifted.
Regarding the third element in
Justice Stevens 's view of the takings
clause-support for general regulations
that advance legitimate state interests
he first noted that "with a temporary
ban on development there is a lesser
risk that individual landowners will be
'singled out' to bear a special burden
that should be shared by the public as
a whole." The reason for the morato
rium-ensuring the continued protec
tion of Lake Tahoe-would provide a
benefit in return for the burden of the
moratorium, thus effectively providing
an "average reciprocity of advantage."
Viewed more broadly, Stevens's opin
ion was a major blow to the "property
rights" position. He garnered a majority
of the Court to support his arguments
that: (1) The First English temporary
taking rule was not applicable when
property could not be used for a period
of time due to normal delays in the
land use process, including moratoria,
although noting that "[i]t may well be
true that any moratorium that lasts for
more than one year should be viewed
with special skepticism"; 71 and (2) be
cause the Lucas categorical taking rule
applies only in "the 'extraordinary case'
in which a regulation permanently de
prives property of all value; the default
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rule remains that, in the regulatory
taking context, we require a more fact
specific inquiry," or, in other words, Penn
Central is the "default" takings rule. 72
Chief Justice Rehnquist's dissent, ar
guing that while "normal delays" should
not be viewed as a temporary taking,
a moratorium of this length should, at
tracted only Justices Scalia and Thomas,
the Court's most conservative justices.
Thomas, joined only by Scalia, also dis
sented, effectively arguing that any de
lay that denied all use was a taking, with
the length of the delay relevant only to
the question of damages.
Justice Stevens perhaps relied on
more than just the force of his argu
ments to craft a six-member majority:
His opinion incorporates major portions
of both Justice Kennedy's majority
opinion and Justice O'Connor's concur
rence in Palazollo. One has to believe
that quoting at length in your opinion
from justices whose votes you are seek
ing to retain is not a mere coincidence,
but rather an effective strategy.
In 2005, the Court ruled on three more
takings cases: Lingle, San Remo, and Keio.
Lingle, in which the Court overturned the
"fails to substantially advance" prong of
Agins, and in the process greatly clarified
takings doctrine, and San Remo, where
the Court held that the federal full faith
and credit statute precluded further liti
gation in federal court of issues that had
been resolved in a state court proceeding,
were both decided unanimously. Keio, in
contrast, was a 5-4 decision that featured
an uncharacteristically strident dissent by
Justice O'Connor.
Lingle clarified takings doctrine in
two aspects. First, Justice O'Connor's
opinion argued that what unifies the
Court's two categorical takings tests
denial of all economically viable use
(Lucas) and physical invasion/occupa
tion (Loretto )-and the Penn Central bal
ancing test, is that each seeks to identify
whether a regulation is the functional
equivalent of a "classic taking in which
government directly appropriates pri
vate property or ousts the owner from
his domain." In other words, the unify
ing factor among these tests is their
direct focus "upon the severity of the
burden that government imposes upon
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Justice Stevens remained on the Court for five more terms, but
Keio would be his last opportunity to present his views on the
I takings clause in a land use case.

private property rights." 73 In contrast,
O'Connor argued, the Agins "substan
tially advances" test "prescribes an in
quiry in the natu_re of due process, not a
takings test, and ... [thus] has no proper
place in our takings jurisprudence." 74
The fatal flaw in this approach is that
"in stark contrast to the three regula
tory takings tests discussed above, the
'substantially advances' inquiry reveals
nothing about the magnitude or charac
ter of the burden a particular regulation
imposes upon private property rights.
Nor does it provide any information
about how any regulatory burden is
distributed among property owners. In
consequence, this test does not help
to identify those regulations whose ef
fects are functionally comparable to
government appropriation or invasion of
private property; it is tethered neither
to the text of the Takings Clause nor to
the basic justification for allowing regu
latory actions to be challenged under
the Clause." 75 Thus, the "substantially
advances" prong of Agins would no
longer be good law. Justice O'Connor
then clarified that while both No/Ian and
Dolan had cited Agins' "substantially
advances" language, the rule in those
exactions cases is not affected by the
rejection of the substantially advances
test as a general takings inquiry. 76 Jus
tice Kennedy added a brief concurring
opinion noting that the decision "did
not foreclose the possibility that a regu
lation might be so arbitrary or irrational
as to violate due process." 77
One can see the influence of Justice
Stevens's view of the takings clause in
Justice O'Connor's opinion. Her empha
sis on the failure of the "substantially ad
vances" test to address the distributional
effects of a regulation reflects Stevens 's
concern about whether the burden of a
regulation is shared generally as opposed
to being imposed on only a few.
Justice Stevens wrote the opinion for
a unanimous Court in San Remo Hotel,
LP. v. City and County ofSan Francisco, 78
a procedural decision that I will discuss
only briefly. The Court took San Remo
to resolve a split between the Second
and Ninth Circuits regarding whether a
plaintiff, who had been forced to seek
compensation for a taking in state court

as mandated by Williamson County, could
then litigate that same takings claim
in federal court. The Second Circuit
had ruled that parties "who litigate
state-law takings claims in state court
involuntarily" pursuant to Williamson
County cannot be precluded from having
those same claims resolved in federal
court. 79 The Ninth Circuit, in San Remo,
disagreed, holding that the federal full
faith and credit statute requires federal
courts to give preclusive effect to any
state-court judgment that would have
preclusive effect under the laws of the
state in which the judgment was ren
dered. Stevens's opinion agreed with the
Ninth Circuit's position. Chief Justice
Rehnquist's concurring opinion, joined
by Justices O'Connor, Kennedy, and
Thomas, agreed that the full faith and
credit statute precluded plaintiffs from
relitigating a takings claim in federal
court, but he also questioned whether
Williamson County's requirement that a
takings claimant must first seek compen
sation in state court should be retained.
Of the Court's three takings deci
sions in 2005, Justice Stevens's majority
opinion in Keio v. City ofNew London 80
by far received the most attention. In
a very real sense, this had less to do
with Stevens's opinion than with the
uncharacteristically strident dissent au
thored by Justice O'Connor. Stevens's
opinion held that the city's exercise
of its eminent domain power solely to
achieve economic development goals
satisfied the "public use" requirement
of the takings clause. The mere fact
that O'Connor dissented in Keio was a
surprise, given that she had authored
the majority opinion in Midkiff hold
ing that the power of eminent domain
was coextensive with the police power,
but the tone of her dissent was a shock.
Although long seen as a moderate oc
cupying a centrist position on the Court,
in Keio, O'Connor not only voted with
Justices Rehnquist, Scalia, and Thomas,
the most conservative members of the
Court, but authored a dissent that rivals
any by Scalia in rhetorical effect.
Justice Stevens's carefully argued
majority opinion stressed the various
factors a court must examine to de
termine whether the use of eminent

domain for economic development is
truly serving a legitimate public pur
pose, rather than improperly promoting
purely a private benefit. Most important
was whether a city was acquiring the
property within "the confines of an
integrated development plan" that was
adopted and implemented by means of
a thorough and deliberative process. 81
But Justice O'Connor's dissent in
sisted that the majority's ruling made
nearly all private property "suscep
tible to condemnation on the Court's
theory." 82 Hammering the point home,
she declared: "The specter of condemna
tion hangs over all property. Nothing is
to prevent the State from replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton, any home
with a shopping mall, or any farm with a
factory." 83 O'Connor's inflamed rhetoric
was immediately picked up and widely
disseminated by advocates for the so
called property-rights movement, as well
as the media, perhaps because capital
izing on the hyperbole of "replacing any
Motel 6 with a Ritz-Carlton" proved irre
sistible when compared with the parsed
tone ofJustice Stevens's opinion.
THE FUTURE?

Justice Stevens remained on the Court for
five more terms, but Keio would be his last
opportunity to present his views on the
takings clause in a land use case. Although
the Court decided a takings case implicat
ing land use regulation in June 2010, 84 Ste
vens did not participate because he owns
beachfront property in Florida that could
be affected by the Court's ruling. Even
though Stevens recused himself, Stop the
Beach Renourishment is worth examining
briefly for the hints it provides as to the
Court's direction in future takings cases
with Stevens no longer on the bench.
In Stop the Beach Renourishment, the
Court considered a facial takings chal
lenge to Florida's Beach and Shore
Preservation Act brought by certain
owners of beachfront property. The Act
provides for the restoration and "re
nourishment" of storm-eroded beaches;
the basis for the property owners' claim
was the effect beach restoration would
have on defining their property lines,
and particularly whether their private
property would continue to extend
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Justice Stevens departs the Court with his view of the takings
clause predominant, rather than Justice Scalia's.

to the water's edge. The Florida Su
preme Court had ruled that under state
property law, when the state restores a
beach by adding sand to land that had
previously been under water, the newly
added portion of the beach belongs to
the state and not the abutting property
owner.
That ruling had two significant ef
fects on the rights of the beachfront
property owners: first, their property no
longer extended to the water's edge,
meaning portions of the now-restored
dry sand beach in front of their homes
were open to the public; and second,
they could no longer claim accretions
to the beach-the gradual and imper
ceptible expansion of the beach due to
waves depositing sand on the shore-as
extending their private property.
The Court was unanimous in finding
that background principles of Florida
state property law supported the state's
position and thus there had been no
taking. But the Court was evenly split
on the question of whether there could
be such a thing as a "judicial taking"
of property. Justice Scalia, joined by
Chief Justice Roberts and Justices
Thomas and Alito, concluded that if a
court declares that what was once an
established right of private property no
longer exists, it has taken that property
in violation of the takings clause. Justice
Kennedy, joined by Justices Sotomayor,
Breyer, and Ginsburg, while agree
ing with Scalia that there had been no
taking, declined to join the portion of
Scalia's opinion that claimed the judicial
branch could effect a taking, arguing
that this case did not require the Court
to decide that question.
What is most interesting about this
case is that Justice Kennedy, the sole re
maining "swing vote" on the Court, voted
with the Court's liberals, rather than its
conservatives, on the judicial taking ques
tion and thus declined again to ally him
self with Justice Scalia's "property rights"
view of the takings clause. Kennedy
had joined Justice Stevens's majority
opinions in Tahoe-Sierra and Keio, but the
composition of the Court had changed ·
considerably since Keio in 2005. On July
1, 2005, Justice O'Connor unexpectedly
announced her retirement. Two months

later, Chief Justice Rehnquist died after
battling cancer for several years. President
George W. Bush appointed two conserva
tive federal appeals court judges as their
replacements: John Roberts as the new
chief justice and Samuel Alito to replace
O'Connor. Four year later, Justice Souter
also resigned unexpectedly and was
replaced by Sonia Sotomayor, a liberal
Second Circuit judge. Thus, the Stop the
Beach Renourishment Court, after Stevens
recused himself, comprised four conserva
tive justices (Roberts, Scalia, Thomas, and
Alito) and three liberal justices (Breyer,
Ginsburg, and Sotomayor), with Kennedy
in the middle. It is worth noting that J us
tice Scalia could not win over Kennedy
as the critical fifth vote to establish the
concept of a judicial taking.
Justice Stevens departs the Court
with his view of the takings clause pre
dominant, rather than Justice Scalia's.
The victories for Scalia's view of the tak
ings clause in First English, Lucas, Nol/an/
Dolan and, to some extent, in Palazollo,
have proved of far less import than was
thought at the time these cases were
decided. First English established that a
compensatory remedy was required for a
temporary taking, but the prevalence of
Stevens's view opposing segmentation
of property interests on either a physical
or temporal basis, as seen in Palazollo
and Tahoe-Sierra, blocked the expan
sion of the compensation rule to include
"normal delays" in permit approvals and
most planning moratoria.
The potential reach of First English
was expanded by Palazollo's abolishing
the notice rule as a bar to a takings claim,
but that expansion was significantly
limited because Justice Scalia failed to
convince the Court that notice of an
existing regulation should play no role
in the Penn Central balancing test. Lucas
has proved to be of little practical value
to takings claimants because regulations
that deprive property of all economi
cally viable use are rare, and regulations
that do have such an effect may well be
grounded in background principles of a
state's property law because they target
nuisance-like uses of property. Finally,
the heightened scrutiny required by
Nol/an/Dolan has remained narrowly con
fined to the exactions context.
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